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We live in a ‘risk society’, as Ulrich Beck stated a few decades ago. Law, in 
general, can be seen as a risk regulation system. If legal rules are conceived as a 
means to influence future human behaviour, they aim to reduce the fundamental 
uncertainty that characterises the future interactions between individuals. This 
contribution focuses on the notion of risk as it is developed in the field of human 
rights and, more precisely, in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case 
law. Both the terminology used by the Court and its reasoning are studied to better 
understand the nature of the obligations imposed on European States with regard to 
the prevention of certain risks that are linked to fundamental rights.  
 
ECtHR and risk: general considerations 
Like other institutions, the ECtHR is often called upon to deal with complex 
situations where the notion of risk is at stake. The most common issues addressed in 
the case law include suicides of individuals who were under state authorities’ control 
(prison or military service), violence against individuals who were notoriously 
threatened by other people, damages to persons and properties caused by natural 
disasters or industrial accidents and the (expected) ill-treatment or torture of persons 
(about to be) returned against their will to their country of origin. In these cases, 
applicants often claim that they are or had been exposed to a particular risk and 
allege that a State fails or had failed to react adequately in order to prevent damage 
(death, injury, etc.) from occurring. The ECtHR must then examine this alleged risk 
in order to check whether the situation leads to a violation of a provision of the 
Convention.  
In this context, the way in which the Court understands the concept of risk and 
carries out risk analysis in practice can be decisive for the outcome of its reasoning. 
The risk analysis that judges have to produce is, however, a complex intellectual 
challenge. Judges have to identify and assess a past or present risk and consider if the 
authorities gave (when the risk occurred in the past) or are giving (when the risk is 
present) an appropriate response with regard to human rights. It means that they 
need to connect past or current decisions or actions taken by State authorities with 
their potential consequences (which, themselves, could happen in the past or in the 
future from the time of judgment). They have to make a decision about situations that 
are characterised by uncertainty. This could be seen as a kind of intellectual time 
travel. My ambition is to better understand how judges proceed when they practice 
this kind of complex exercise. In particular, I wonder if the ECtHR is guided by 
scientific methodologies of risk analysis and assessment (that may have been 
developed by other scientific disciplines, like economics) or if it applies a rather 
intuitive approach. 
In order to provide some answers to this question, I propose to examine the 
ECtHR case law in two complementary ways. On the one hand, I analyse the 
terminology used by the Court when a question of risk is at stake. On the other hand, 
I try to examine the reasoning of the Court through a reading grid based on the basic 
elements that structure risk assessment theory, i.e., the concepts of severity, 
likelihood and acceptance. 
 
ECtHR and risk: terminology 
The word “risk” appears very frequently in the case law of the ECtHR. It is of 
interest to examine with which other words and especially with which adjectives the 
noun “risk” is used, since it can help to understand the approach of the Court when it 
has to deal with the concept of risk. The most frequent formulas that can be found in 
the relevant case law are “real and immediate risk” or simply “real risk”. In many 
situations, the obligation for a State to act depends on the existence of a risk qualified 
as such. 
The key question is what the adjectives “real” and “immediate” mean. The 
Court, however, does not provide a general definition of these terms. According to the 
Oxford Dictionary online, something “real” is “actually (…) occurring in fact”; it is 
“not imagined or supposed”. Understood in this way, the adjective “real” in the 
relevant case law (translated as “réel” or sometimes “certain” in the French versions 
of the judgments) would not indicate a particular level of risk, but could mean that 
the Court only takes into consideration a potential damage whose occurrence is 
objectively demonstrable, as a possible consequence of a situation over which the 
authorities have or had some control. As for the “immediate” nature of the risk, it 
possibly implies that the potential damage is in the process of materialising. It is 
understandable, from the reading of some judgments, that the criterion is satisfied 
when threats appear to lead to “imminent materialisation”. The court, as an official 
body composed of lawyers, not of risk managers, is primarily interested in the 
question of evidence, and this is reflected in the terminology that it favours. A real 
risk would be a risk whose existence can be strongly demonstrated, independently of 
its level. When the Court requires the existence of an immediate risk, it refers to a risk 
that is clearly apparent, almost obvious, due to the chronological proximity of its 
potential materialisation. It may be helpful here to refer to the distinction between 
ontological uncertainty (we know that something produces uncertain consequences 
in certain circumstances) and epistemic uncertainty (we do not know – or we are not 
sure to know – what consequences something produces in certain circumstances). It 
could be argued that the ECtHR requires a reaction from States whenever there is a 
risk for which epistemic uncertainty is low, since there are sufficient data on the 
causality between a situation and a potential harmful effect, even if an ontological 
uncertainty remains. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the analysis of 
cases where a decision or the execution of a decision, which could lead to damage, is 
still to come. This configuration most often occurs in cases where the expulsion of a 
person to a foreign State is about to be executed. In these situations, the Court 
requires an appropriate reaction of the relevant state as soon as there is a “real risk”, 
without using the adjective “immediate”. The absence of reference to the notion of 
immediacy seems logical here: when one examines the situation of someone before a 
decision is taken, the risk that he or she will suffer the harmful consequences of that 
decision is of course not perceived as immediate – in the sense of imminent – since 
its materialisation depends, among other things, on a decision that is still to be taken. 
These interpretations are certainly not indisputable. A detailed study of the 
terminology used in the case law, both in English and French, reveals some 
inconsistencies which suggest an unsystematic approach. However, the linguistic 
analysis does not reveal that the court seeks to assess risk according to criteria 
typically used in other disciplines. In particular, it is not common for the Court to use 
words that express the level of the risk on a scale, as a risk analysis specialist would. 
The terms frequently employed by the ECtHR suggest that it is guided by intrinsically 
legal considerations. 
 
ECtHR and risk: reasoning 
When one extends the analysis beyond terminology to the overall reasoning of 
the Court in its judgments, references to some key elements of the risk literature can 
be found. To elaborate on this idea, some basic concepts need to be explained. Firstly, 
the common risk analysis is fundamentally based on the determination of two 
elements: the likelihood and the severity of the potential damage. The level of a risk 
is the product of the values of these two factors, such that R (risk) = L (likelihood) × S 
(severity). Secondly, once a risk has been identified and analysed, the next step is to 
examine the acceptance of this risk. It remains to be decided whether or not to take 
this risk, which raises the question of whether it is acceptable or not. This exercise is 
partially influenced by the first operation: a low risk is in abstracto more acceptable 
than a high risk. However, evaluating acceptance also involves other parameters, so 
that, in concreto, a significant risk may be more acceptable than a lower one. This is 
because the benefit – understood here broadly, not only in the financial sense – that 
is expected when taking that particular risk is an essential element to be included in 
the analysis. This operation is necessarily subjective: it is above all a question of 
perception, which involves cultural and psychological factors. 
Even if the reasoning of the Court, in the relevant case law, is not 
systematically based on these three concepts (severity, likelihood and acceptance), it 
is arguable that all of them play a role, explicitly or implicitly, when compliance to 
fundamental rights is discussed in combination with the notion of risk.  
Regarding the first concept, it can be observed that the Court often examines 
whether the (potential) damage exceeds a “minimum level of severity”; this operation 
means that the degree of severity must be assessed and that, below a certain level, the 
situation is presumed not to involve a violation of the Convention. On the other hand, 
when the bar is crossed, an alert level is reached. When a sufficiently serious 
(potential) damage is identified, the other parameters (likelihood and acceptance) 
can be used to decide whether a violation of the Convention is finally found. A 
particular difficulty arises from the fact that, according to the Court, the assessment 
of the minimum level of severity is itself relative and depends on the factual data in 
the case under consideration. In my view, this reflects a certain aggregation, or even 
confusion, between two parts of the reasoning: that of the severity of the potential 
damage and that of the risk acceptance. 
The assessment of the likelihood of damage is at the heart of many cases 
involving risk. To examine if the occurrence of a harmful event is more or less 
probable, the Court refers to various data, provided by the parties or collected by 
itself. For example, when the Court has to assess the risk of ill-treatment in the event 
of the expulsion of a person to another country, it relies on reports, produced by 
various governmental or non-governmental sources, which describe the situation in 
that country regarding the compliance with human rights. Furthermore, the Court 
sometimes seems to assume that some non-European States are not safe, which is a 
presumption that the likelihood of damage is higher in such States. 
Finally, the examination of the elastic notion of risk acceptance could provide 
explanations for legal concepts that also have an elastic character, such as legitimacy, 
proportionality or margin of appreciation of States. We outline here two kinds of 
considerations. First, the Court regularly holds that not every risk implies an 
obligation on the part of the State to prevent it. The positive obligation “must not be 
interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on 
the authorities”. Since the States do not have infinite capacity, particularly in terms of 
human and financial resources, it must be accepted that they cannot react to and 
manage all the risks that could raise questions under the Convention. As to how they 
should allocate their resources, the Court leaves the States a relatively wide margin of 
appreciation in determining their priorities and the potentiality of some damages 
must be accepted. Secondly, it can be observed that other considerations, which 
derive from the overall dynamics of the Convention, are likely to make some risks 
acceptable. Even if the authority has the resources to identify and respond to a 
particular risk, it does not have the right to do everything possible to achieve its ends 
– even the most legitimate ones, such as protecting people's lives. For example, with 
regard to the prevention of violence, the Court takes into account “the need to ensure 
that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which 
fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place 
restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime (…)”. This implies that 
States cannot be on the alert for every risk, even if they have the resources to do so, 
and that some risks must be accepted.  
